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I.

Introduction

After eight years of negotiations, Mexico and the Central American nations of the
Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala) have agreed to a free trade
agreement, which went into effect January 2001.1 According to the treaty, 50 percent of
the trade flows will be liberalized at the outset while duties on industrial goods will be
gradually lifted over the next twelve years.
The Mexico-Northern Triangle Free Trade Agreement (MNT-FTA) represents to the
Northern Triangle a new set of disciplines on issues of market access, removal of duties,
and non-tariff barriers. For these purposes, the MNT-FTA was modeled on the principles and standards of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), including
sensitive topics, such as agricultural products, rules of origin, and trade in services.
In general, the MNT-FTA's objective is to integrate the small economies of the
Northern Triangle of Central America with the Mexican economy. But the regional
economic indices probably will complicate the achievement of this goal. A bird's eye
view of the human development levels of the Northern Triangle economies revealed
that Guatemala has a population of eleven million, and Honduras and El Salvador each
have over six million people, the great majority of whom live below the poverty line
(around 80 percent in all three countries).2 In addition, the Northern Triangle region
had an estimated $6.5 billion in exports in 1999, versus Mexico, with a population of
100 million and exports amounting to $242 billion in 1998.'
As we see, the asymmetrical economics between Mexico and the Northern Triangle
countries are remarkable. With the MNT-FTA, however, the Northern Triangle is only
following the current trend of trade liberalization that is common throughout Central
America. In fact, Costa Rica and Nicaragua already signed similar free trade deals with
Mexico in 1995 and 1998, respectively. In practice, the MNT-FTA is just another step to
integrate Central America with Mexico.
Through the MNT-FTA the Northern Triangle is trying to compensate for the small
size of its markets, achieve economies of scale, and increase its competitiveness, as other
free trade agreements are rapidiy subscribed aii over the Americas aLoLIdu. . u the neoliberal economic policy.4 In addition, the MNT-FTA is viewed as a way to recover from
the economic setbacks caused by adverse natural disasters, such as Hurricane Mitch and
the devastating earthquakes in El Salvador. In contrast, through the MNT-FTA, Mexico
is attempting to diversify its markets and reduce its dependency on the U.S. economy,
which has been a major consequence of NAFTA.

1.

Pilar Franco, Trade Latam: Mexico-Central America Free Trade Deal Ready, Inter Press Ser-

vice (May 11, 2000), available at http://www.ips.org/index.htm (on file with the Inter Press
Service).
2.
3.

Id.
Id.

4.

This term is also currently referred to as the "Washington Consensus." The term covers a set of
policies attempting to promote macroeconomic stabilization in developing countries through:
fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditures, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, a
competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of the FDI inflows, privatization,
and deregulation. See Moises Naim, Fads and Fashions in Economic Reforms: Washington

Consensus or Washington Confusion, FOREIGN

POLICY MAGAZINE

(Oct. 26, 1999).
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The purpose of this article is to evaluate the economic factors and interests behind
the MNT-FTA, the reasons that are driving the integration efforts, and the foreseeable
tendencies for the Northern Triangle region as it advances on the path of trade liberalization. The article initially presents an overview of the events promoting integration,
starting with the Central American integration process, the partial scope commercial
agreements with Mexico, and the renewal of the free trade negotiations initiated by the
meetings of Tuxtla.
Second, this article presents the objectives pursued by Mexico and the strategic
perspective towards the isthmus, all in concert with its efforts to achieve an economic
impact on Chiapas, and thus, assist in solving the problems with the Zapatista armed
rebellion. Also, the article presents the Mexican framework of the Puebla-Panama Plan
and the steps taken for a greater integration of Mexico's southeastern states (Chiapas,
Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatan) with Central America.
Third, this article evaluates the approaches taken by Central America and the
Northern Triangle regarding free trade agreements, its moves toward trade liberalization,
future plans for economic integration, and the goal of diversification of its industrial
base.
Fourth, the article makes several comparisons between the MNT-FTA and NAFTA,
presenting the disciplines incorporated in its procedures.
Fifth, the article considers the economic integration efforts by Central America and
the interacting forces behind the political conditions that gave it the opportunity to
establish economic relationships throughout the Western Hemisphere. This article also
explores the Central American perspective to free trade agreements and explains the
strategies of the area toward trade liberalization with Mexico, as a first step, as well as
the intended treaties with the Dominican Republic, Canada, Chile, and the United States
as the final goal.
Finally, the article appraises Central America's opportunities for successful integration in the Western Hemisphere and its perspectives in the global economy.

II.

Historical Overview/Background
A.

THE

CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET

After World War II, the Central American region enjoyed relative stability. There
was an increase of its annual gross product (5.2 percent) between 1950 and 1978, which
was a result of both the stability of the world markets and local efforts.' The region,
however, has always relied heavily on agricultural products for its exports, making it
vulnerable to the fluctuation of commodity markets around the globe, especially after
the 1980s.
Given the small size of the Central American markets and economies, an integrated region was proposed as a better alternative for economic development. During the
1950s, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) in Mexico City drew up plans to create a Central American Common Market
5.

Ricardo Cevallos, The Central American Bank for Economic Integration, 4
CoNiP. L. 245, 246 (1996).

TUL. J. INT'L &
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(CACM) among Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The basic
rationale for CACM was that an economically integrated Central America would create
the necessary economies of scale required to support a viable industrial sector.' At the
time, the Central American economic integration program was based upon the import
substitution model of development, constituting the oldest sub-regional agreement in
the Latin American area.
Despite the excellent performance of the CACM during its first decade, armed conflicts between its members and domestic civil unrest swept the area during the late 1970s
and early 1980s, causing its disruption and eventual collapse.
The emergence of the European Union and the formation of other regional trading
blocs, such as MERCOSUR in South America and NAFTA in North America, encouraged the presidents of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador
to meet during the early 1990s to revive the concept of an integrated CACM. 7 Recent
border disputes between Honduras and Nicaragua, however, again threaten the integration process, as the latter has imposed a 35 percent tariff to all products coming from
Honduras.
Initially, the modern economic relationships of the CACM with Mexico began within
the framework of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) by means of partial
scope agreements that enabled the region to achieve preferential access to the Mexican
market. This commercial regime was based upon preferences over outstanding duties,
and products enjoyed free access as long as they complied with the required rules of
origin. These agreements, however, did not stipulate that Central American countries
would give reciprocity to Mexican products. As a result, the levels of exports from the
region to Mexico were not significant.
The partial scope agreements were first renewed yearly, and during the last days of
its legal effect for a period of six months. Nonetheless, these deals experienced some
deficiencies. For example, some products were subject to export quotas and the most
important Central American exports were not subject to preferential treatment. In fact,
the partial scope -agreements did not achieve the evnected results, as Meyico erected
quotas and licenses to limit its imports from the region, though the trade relationship
was favorable to Mexico during the period in which they were in force.
B.

THE TUXTLA ACTS AND DECLARATIONS

1.

The Tuxtla I Act

The presidents of all the Central American countries and the president of Mexico
signed the Tuxtla Act and Declaration on January 11, 1991, in the city of Tuxtla Gutierrez.
These documents established an Economic Complementation Program (ECP) containing the following programs: trade liberation, financial cooperation, development of the
exportable offer, primary sector cooperation, energetic supply, investment development,

6.
7.

Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Esq., The Central American Integration System (SICA) at the Dawn
of the New Century 1 (unpublished manuscript, on file with Law and Business Review of the
Americas).
Id.at 2.
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and cooperation and technical training.8 In February 1992, the economic ministers of
Mexico and the member countries of the CACM met and set a calendar for negotiations
to set up a free trade agreement by December 31, 1996. 9 Unfortunately, for particular
reasons, the trade liberation program was developed only by Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
The Tuxtla II Act
On February 15 and 16, 1996, the presidents of all the Central American countries,
plus Panama and Belize, met again with Mexico's president in San Jos6, Costa Rica. The
Tuxtla II meetings were designed to implement the dialogue and cooperation among its
Member States as agreed in the first meeting of Tuxtla. As part of the trade liberalization
program of the Tuxtla action plan, the agreement was: (a) to invigorate the negotiation
process for a free trade and investment agreement between Mexico and the Northern
Triangle and (b) to conclude the negotiation process with a free trade agreement between
Mexico and Nicaragua." At the time, Costa Rica had finished its negotiations with
Mexico for a free trade deal, which was already in force.
After four years of consultations between Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries, starting with the renewal of the negotiations by the Tuxtla II meetings in 1996,
and ending with eighteen rounds of intense negotiations on May 10, 2000, a free trade
agreement was finally implemented.
2.

The Tuxtla III Act
The third meeting of all the presidents of the countries integrating the Dialogue and
Settlement procedures of Tuxtla (Mecanismo de Dial6go y Concertaci6n de Tuxtla) was
celebrated on July 17, 1998, in the city of El Salvador, El Salvador. The meeting planned
to enhance the objectives set forth by the Tuxtla II agreements and to reinforce economic
cooperation among its members. The meeting also established several policies and goals
on the subjects of immigration, environmental protection, antidrug enforcement cooperation, sustainable development, tourism, and citizen security. Separately, Mexico renewed
the partial scope agreements with the Northern Triangle countries as the MNT-FTA was
negotiated.
In addition, the Tuxtla III Joint Declaration included a statement of support for the
free trade agreements negotiated by Mexico with Panama and Belize, countries located
in the isthmus, though for historic reasons were not considered part of the Central
American integration process. The Tuxtla III meetings restated the commitment of the
member countries "that once completed all the free trade agreements between Mexico
and the Central American Countries, we can begin a process in order to obtain their
3.

8.
9.
10.

Las Relaciones Comerciales Mexico Centroamerica en el Marco de los Acuerdos de Tuxtla,
SECRETARfA DE INTEGRACI6N ECON6MICA CENTROAMERICANA, available at http://www.
sieca.org.gt [hereinafter Tuxtla Agreements).
Jason R. Wolff, Putting the Cart before the Horse: Assessing Opportunities for Regional
Integration in Latin America, 20-SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 112 (1996).
Tuxtla Agreements, supra note 8.
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convergence in a single treaty."" This goal is unmet, since the free trade agreements of
Mexico with Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and now, the Northern Triangle have been recently
signed. However, Mexico recently launched the Puebla-Panama initiative to speed the
process.
Therefore, the Tuxtla III agreements set in motion the move toward trade liberalization and open regionalism, highlighting the compromise of its members to support the
building of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) "with the objective of progressively eliminating the barriers of trade and investment within the American Continent."
Moreover, the Tuxtla meetings established the framework for trade liberalization in Central America, promoting the insertion of the region into NAFTA.
Still, in spite of the Tuxtla framework, the flows of Mexican direct investment to the
area have been relatively low compared to the disparity of the balance of trade between
Mexico and Central America, so the benefits of the process in terms of reducing this
disparity have been minimal. 3

The Critical Assessment of the Mexican
Strategic Perspective

III.
A.

REDUCING THE

NAFTA

ECONOMIC EFFECT AND ITS DEPENDENCY

FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN AREA

Viewed broadly, Mexico has demonstrated some apprehension in its relationships
with the United States. Historically, this concern can be traced from the conflicts between
U.S. settlers in Texas and their further expansion westwards into Mexican Territory, an
event that Mexicans refer to even today as the "War of North American Invasion." During
that period, U.S. forces occupied Veracruz, Monterrey, and Mexico City. In the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), Mexico ceded a vast area of territory including California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and parts of Colorado and Nevada. Five years later, the United
States nurchasPd additinna! Mexican linds in Ariiona nnd New Mexico. completing its
southwestern expansion. Few U.S. citizens are aware of the history, but few Mexican
citizens have forgotten the invasion and losses of Mexico. This event has had a significant
impact in the further development of political and economic relationships with the
United States. Even today, "American business people are advised to be aware of this
event, and sensitive to the importance it continues to hold for Mexicans.""
Despite these reasons, Mexico accepted the U.S. proposition of NAFTA, pushed by
a combination of economic, social, and political problems during the debt crisis. These
events led Mexico to undertake a process of economic reform, discarding the mixed
economy model and granting preferential access to U.S. investments, regardless of its
fears of dependency and loss of sovereignty.
11.

12.
13.
14.

Declaraci6n Conjunta de la III Reuni6n de lefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los Paises Integrantes del Mecanismo de Dilogo y Concertaci6n de Tuxtla, July 17, 1998, available at
http://www.sieca.org.gt/publico/Reuniones-Presidentes/Tuxtla-II/declaracion-conjunta.htm.
Id.
Tuxtla Agreements, supra note 8.
Ralph H. Folsom, Michael Wallace Gordon & David Lopez, NAFTA: A Problem Oriented
Course Book 25 (2000).
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In general, since NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994, the Mexican economy has
shown a concentration of its exports to the North American area, especially to the United
States. This outcome has been called the "NAFTA effect."
In fact, since NAFTA began dismantling trade barriers between its members,
Mexico's exports to the United States have increased dramatically. Today, approximately
85 percent of Mexico's exported goods go to the United States.15 Conversely, about
80 percent of Mexico's imported goods come from the United States.' 6 In 1997, Mexico
7
became the fastest growing U.S. export market, surpassing both Canada and Japan.'
In spite of the positive effect of NAFTA on the Mexican economy, the concentration
phenomenon has raised significant concerns on its authorities, especially regarding the
sensitive issue of economic dependency from the United States. For example, in 1982,
21 percent of Mexico's exports went 8to Europe but, in 1998, only 3.2 percent of its
exports went to the European Union.'
In part due to this shift, Mexico has embarked upon the promotion of foreign
investment flows in an effort to reduce its dependency on North American markets.
This strategy has been formalized through a permanent framework of trade and investment rules, embodied in multilateral and preferential arrangements. In the multilateral
arena, Mexico became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in 1994, and a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Mexico's active program of regional negotiations-adding to its
earlier co-operation agreement with Chile-resulted in the entry into force of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States in 1994,
and similar free trade agreements with Costa Rica, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela
(within the Group of Three in 1995),' 9 the European Union, Nicaragua and, recently,
with the Northern Triangle.
In this context, the Free Trade Agreement with the Northern Triangle reflects
Mexico's strategy to diversify and improve access of its products to international markets, and thus, reduces its dependency on the NAFTA region. This view is confirmed
by the statement released by the Mexican government considering the signature of the
MNT-FTA as a step to "reduce the vulnerability of our exports in front of unilateral
partners, and foments the flows of direct
measures that can be taken by our commercial
20
foreign investment towards Mexico."

15.

Leonard Bierman et al., The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Market Analysis, 27
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 719, 731 (1994).
Id.
David M. Gilmore, Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is it Desirable?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REv. 383, 394 (2000).
Tratado de libre comercio Mexico-Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador (TLCTNM), Secretaria
de Economia (Jan. 2000), available at http://secofisnci.gob.mx.noticias/triang.htm (on file
with the Mexican Secretary of Economy) [hereinafter Secofi Bulletin].
WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Reviews, Mexico: October 1997 (Oct. 2, 1997), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tp63-e.htm.
Secofi Bulletin, supra note 18.
VAND.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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B.

THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION, THE ZAPATISTA DILEMMA,
AND THE PUEBLA-PANAMA

INITIATIVE

Historically, Central America has been an area of Mexican influence since the colonial period of the New Spain. Cultural and political ties with Mexico have been regarded
as of great importance in the area. Mexico's interests in Central America have, however,
been tempered by U.S. actions in the region.2' Oddly enough, Mexico is looking again to
the region within the context of NAFTA, but now under a different global and political
context.
Despite its modest size, the Northern Triangle countries are the principal export
market for Mexico in Latin America, representing 25 percent of its exports to the Latin
America region. In 1999, Mexican exports to the Northern Triangle were comparable to
the sum of its exports to Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, 22 without considering the markets
of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. In fact, the MNT-FTA has consolidated the preferential
access of Mexican exports. To date, the Mexican government has tried to regain its
position in the area by participating in the Central American integration process, and
now, Mexico takes part as an extra regional member of the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration (CABEI), investing $275 million in its capital markets.
Another little known reason for Mexico entering into the MNT-FTA is the attempt
to tackle the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas. The Zapatista National Liberation Army
(EZLN) uprising represents Mexico's most serious armed insurgency in decades since
the Mexican Army violently crushed the guerilla revolt of Lucio Cabafias in the State of
Guerrero in the 1970s. 23 In general, the Indian rebellion instantly darkened the social
and legal perspectives within the country, especially obscuring its political and economic
image abroad. 24 The explosion of the Chiapas rebellion took Mexico, and the world by
surprise, especially at the time that2 the Salinas administration was dealing with the initial
euphoria of NAFTAs legal arrival. 1
Since NAFTA entered into force, the Zapatista Rebels have become bitter critics of
the treaty and vigorous opponents of free trade, considering it an outcome of corporate
interests and unfettered capitalism that destroyed the existing economic system in rural
areas, where most indigenous peoples are located.2 6 Ironically, Mexico uses the Free
Trade Agreement with the Northern Triangle to incorporate the interests of this area
traditionally abandoned by the federal government.
The State of Chiapas borders Guatemala, one of the Northern Triangle countries,
and is therefore not only physically, but also economically part of Central America.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Thomas M. Leonard, Canada and the Crisis in Central America, LATIN AM. RES. REV., Mar.
22, 1996, available at 1996 WL 13043654 (1996) (reviewing Castaiada et al., The Difficult
Triangle: Mexico, Central America and the United States (1992).
Secofi Bulletin, supra note 18.
Jorge A. Vargas, NAFTA, the Chiapas Rebellion and the Emergence of Mexican Ethnic Law, 25
CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 1, 2 (1994).

id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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Consequently, as the Mexican government has recognized in a recent bulletin:
The MNT-FTA will have a great regional economic impact in the Southern Mexican region,
mainly in the state of Chiapas. This State by its geographic location, and because it is the
nearest state to these three countries, will have a very important increase in commerce,
production and in the service sector as a result of the treaty. We have great complementarities,
there already exists an integration in the region of Chiapas, the Mexican Southeastern and
Central America, and we considered that this process will increase in the future. 7
Driven by this perspective Mexico's president, Vicente Fox, recently launched the
Puebla-Panama initiative, as an effort to push for a free trade zone extending from
Mexico to Panama, but officially publicized as part of a bid to stem illegal immigration.28 The reality, however, of this initiative is that the Mexican government is trying to
incorporate its southeastern region (Chiapas, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco,
Veracruz, and Yucatan) with Central America and, therefore, incorporate the region with
the currents of worldwide commerce, giving Chiapas a market for its products in order
to compete internationally. In this sense, President Fox has recognized:' 29 "We want to be
the bridge between Central America and the North American Region."
The Puebla-Panama initiative calls for the very first time a framework to deepen the
integration of the Mexican southeastern states with the isthmus as a whole, including
countries that traditionally have not been regarded as part of the Central American
region, such as Panama and Belize. The process will be developed by "infrastructure,
educational homologation, and an energy policy for the region, the fight against poverty,
and the promotion to micro, small and medium industry."3
Until now, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Central American
Bank of Economic Integration (CABEI) have supported the Puebla-Panama initiative,
and the World Bank may support the project as well. In principle, the initiative encompasses six objectives:
(1) Economic structural change;
(2) Advantage of vocations between the involved countries;
(3) Promotion of productive investment;
(4) Human development; and
31
(5) Social development.
In the medium term, these projects will stimulate the economic and commercial integra-

tion by developing highway infrastructure, electricity interconnection systems, telecommunications, ports, and by upgrading the border crossings and regulations.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Secofi Bulletin, supra note 18.
Will Weissert, Mexico's Fox to Push for Free Trade, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 11, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 26674460.
Vicente Fox pone en marcha la integraci6n econ6mica con Centroamrrica,LA PRENSA, Mar. 13,
2001, available at http://www.laprensahn.com/natarc/0
1300l.htm.
Lucy Conger, Las relaciones de Mexico con sus vecinos latinoamericanos tendrdn mayor
atenci6n y vigor cone el President Fox, AMERICA ECONOMIA, Dec. 28, 2000, at
http://www.americaeconomia.com (on file with AMERICA ECONOMIA).
Julio A. Gomez, Necesita el sureste caminos de Paz, no de violencia, EL ECONOMISTA, Mar. 13,
2001, at http://www.economista.com.mx (on file with EL ECONOMISTA).
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Fox's administration initially plans to invest 4.2 billion pesos (U.S.$433 million)
in the regional infrastructure. Additionally, the Puebla-Panama Plan will include the
construction of three strategic highways: one to the Gulf Coast, one to the Pacific
Ocean, and one connecting Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula to a fast, efficient route to the
United States. Still, those who fear that the Puebla-Panama process could erase southern
Mexico's rich
cultural heritage have criticized Fox's plans for economic development of
32
the region.

C.

THE EFFORT TO POSITION MEXICO AS THE PREFERENTIAL EXPORT
PLATFORM IN THE HEMISPHERE

As we have seen, by almost all accounts NAFTA has been a windfall for the Mexican
economy. Under NAFTA, Mexican products now have access to nearly 280 million
wealthy consumers, and investments from Canada and the United States have steadily
increased during the last couple of years. Even with the serious economic downturn
Mexico endured in late 1994 and early 1995 during the peso crisis, the country has
seen substantial growth in its trade with its NAFTA partners, as well as experienced a
blossoming of foreign direct investment. From 1994 to 1996, Mexico received U.S.$25
billion of foreign direct investment in plants and equipment. This was the second largest
amount of foreign direct investment of that type to a developing country ever recorded.3
Following the passage of NAFTA, however, Mexico launched vast trade negotiations
using a piecemeal accession strategy through Latin America, Asia, and Europe in order
to attract more foreign investment and position itself as the preferential export platform
in the hemisphere. In this process, the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement with the
European Union was of paramount importance to Mexico.
It is important to note that Mexico is attracting foreign investment flows using as
incentive its access to the lucrative NAFTA markets and to other regions via regional trade
agreements (RTA). As a result, this piecemeal accession may have adverse global welfare
effects if it is based on trade diversion, and also may cause the departure of ttae anid
investment from the remaining RTA partners to Mexico, as leading economic analyses
and models of regional free trade suggest.34 It is important to point out that the Mexican
industries that are attracting foreign investment may not be the most efficient producers,
but may benefit solely from the asymmetries resulting from a piecemeal accession. More
importantly, the Mexican piecemeal accession process can decrease the foreign capital
available to Mexico's RTA partners and could have adverse dynamic effects on them.3"
Interestingly, among the companies that have been closely following the negotiations
between Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries are those U.S. corporations that
already have operations based in Mexico, largely as a result of NAFTA. So, the free

32.
33.
34.
35.

Traci Carl, Fox Announces Development Planfor Southern Mexico and Central America, AssoCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, available at 3/12/01 APWIRES 16:10:00.
See Gilmore, supra note 17.
Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 539, 550 (1995).
Id. at 562.
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trade agreement with the Northern Triangle would give their Mexican-produced
goods
36
duty-free entrance into Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

IV. The Critical Assessment of the Central
American Perspective
The increasing convergence of trade liberalization policies in the region is more
the outcome of policies followed by virtually all Latin America than the result of a
deliberate process.37 This characteristic can be traced from the very beginnings of the
Central American economic integration process, since the CACM was not propagated
by a regional political consensus but was driven primarily by external forces.
Central American governments have not made full use of this powerful development tool. Even today, Central American countries individually are negotiating free trade
38
agreements with third countries in disregard of their commitments to the CACM.
Additionally, the institutional mechanisms designed to solve dispute among the Member
States have also proven to be ineffective, as evidenced by the recent conflict between
Honduras and Nicaragua, which eventually was directed to the WTO.39 As an overall
result, Central America strategic policies in this respect did not appear to have a clear
objective.
On the other hand, opening markets, expanding hemispheric economic integration, and promoting sustainable development have been enunciated as key areas of U.S.
national interest in Central America.4" Therefore, U.S. policies have promoted the neoliberal model in the region, also referred to as the "Washington Consensus" because it
has been sponsored by international organizations based in Washington, D.C.
In 1982, President Reagan first proposed the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) to spur
growth and promote political and social stability in Central America and the countries of
the Caribbean Basin. For this purpose, the United States Congress subsequently enacted
two major laws that comprised the heart of the CBI: the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act
(CBERA) enacted in 1983 and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1990
(CBERA II). The major benefits these laws conferred were the duty free entrance into
the United States of a wide range of products grown or manufactured in CBI-beneficiary
countries and a special access program containing Guaranteed Access Levels (GAL) that
guarantee markets for apparel assembled from U.S. formed and U.S. cut material. 4
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Central American Countries Joining Forces to Capture Investments,
LATIN Am. L. & Bus. REP. (1998), available at 1998 WL 10751280, at * 6.
Inter-American Development Bank, Recent Trends in Central America, available at
http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/blokit/cacmre.htm.
Manuel R. Agosin et al., Globalization, Liberalization and Sustainable Development
in Central America 11 (Feb. 2000), available at http://magnet.undp.org/new/pdf/
Central%20America.pdf.
See O'Keefe, supra note 6, at 14.
U.S. Agency for International Development, 1997 Central American Regional Congressional
Presentation, available at http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp97/lac/centamer.htm (last visited Aug.
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Increasingly, U.S. agencies have taken the prominent role in the integration of
the area, providing technical assistance, training, and research in support of Central
America's efforts to reform its regional trade regime. This assistance has contributed
importantly to the adoption of a more outward-oriented regional integration model
characterized by lower external tariffs, accelerated implementations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO commitments, and the reduction in both
intra- and extra-regional nontariff trade barriers.42 These efforts have brought to the
region an export-oriented model of development and open regionalism after a long
period of protectionism.
Even more significantly, the U.S. government-through the U.S. Agency for International Development (US-AID)--has prepared Central American readiness to enter into
the hemispheric free trade agreements, focusing on four major areas:
(1) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Supporting Central American efforts to
strengthen IPR policies and to enhance enforcement capabilities through:
(a) development of model Central American conventions on trademark,
patent and copyright conventions; (b) increasing the public's awareness of
the importance of adequate IPR protection to investment, technology transfer
and sustainable development; (c) support for Central American efforts to
build regional and national consensus on required IPR policy changes; and
(d) technical training to patent, trademark and copyright registry officials.
(2) Further trade liberalization. Supporting Central American measures to further liberalize both intra- and extra-regional trade. Activities focus on critical
nontariff barriers and emphasize making regional legislation consistent with
standards. Also, U.S. technical experts have assisted and enhanced the Central
American participation in the Summit of the Americas FTAA working groups.
(3) Enhanced protection of regional and foreign investment. Assisting the region
to improve dispute resolution procedures, eliminate policy constraints to
increased regional and foreign investment, afford national or most-favorednation treatment to all investors, and establish international standards for
expropriation, which provide for prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
(4) Better protection of worker rights and improved labor relations. US-AID has
contributed to strengthen the protection of internationally recognized workers rights through improving and simplifying labor legislation, as appropriate,
and upgrading the region's enforcement capabilities. Regional workshops and
national seminars emphasize: (a) the relationship between increased trade and
better wages and the higher levels of competitiveness and productivity required
to succeed in hemispheric markets; (b) workers' rights and their relationship
to trade preferences; and (c) models of labor-management cooperation that
contribute to both increased productivity and higher wages.43 As a result, the
Central American legal infrastructure was reformed and moved toward a more
market-oriented environment.

42.
43.

See Congressional Presentation, supra note 40.
Id.
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Aside from these initiatives, the United States has also entered into unilateral trade
preference programs with CBI-beneficiary countries, including certain Central American
countries to ensure access of apparel articles into the U.S. market. This is the so-called
"Special Access Program," formerly known as 807-A or Super 807, which liberalizes quotas for textiles and apparel entering into the United States. The Special Access Program
has attracted a large number of investments in textiles and apparel assembly from Asia,
particularly Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan.44
Historically, the United States is the most significant trading partner of Central
American nations. These nations have experienced significant economic downturns
because of their inability to compete with Mexico since the signature of NAFTA,45
especially as some of its products, like apparel (the fastest growing category of U.S.
imports from the region), are ineligible for tariff preferences equivalent to the ones
granted to Mexico. These exports may only get reduced tariffs if they are assembled
with fabric wholly owned, formed, and cut in the United States.
In addition, Central American countries have been competing with Mexico on
unequal terms because of the 16.7 percent tariff applicable to the value added to garments assembled in CBI nations, while no such tariffs are applied to Mexican-assembled
garments.4 6 Additionally, the region has expressed its fears that investment will be
diverted from the area. Consequently, Central American nations have been searching
desperately for the instruments to obtain "NAFTA parity" benefits, in order to regain
competitiveness and move away from the unilateral scheme of preferences granted by
the CBI initiatives.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the unanimous call in the Summit of the
Americas for a "Free Trade Area of the Americas" (FTAA), the Central American Alliance
for Sustainable Development that led to the Central American-U.S. Joint Declaration
(CONCAUSA), and especially the Declaration of San Jose,47 have all created the political
background to access (or at least negotiate) preferential commercial benefits with the
United States, giving a valid possibility to push for bloc accession to NAFTA. However,
the macroeconomic indexes of the region (except for Costa Rica) have conspired against
these efforts.
Under these circumstances, the MNT-FTA officially has been promoted as a way
by which the Northern Triangle economies can foster market discipline, commercial
competitiveness, and supportive structural policies in response to NAFTA. Additionally,
the Northern Triangle countries with the MNT-FTA are trying to become a development
pole, and thus attain economic importance to the United States.
In any event, the MNT-FTA is a product of the convergence process that NAFTA
started in Latin America. On the other hand, negotiations were accelerated by the fact
44. See Fenate, supra note 41, at 128.
45. See Gilmore, supra note 17, at 396.
46. See Wolff, supra note 9, at 112-13.
47. The Declaration of San Jose is the definition of a new model of Integral Association for

the Region. The Declaration took place on May 8, 1997 in San Jose, Costa Rica, when the
Presidents of the Central American countries, the Dominican Republic, the United States, and
the First Minister of Belize adopted the Declaration fostering the creation of the necessary
conditions to reach a Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Central America. See also
Ernesto Leal S., Declaraci6n de San Jose: A New Stage in Central America-USA Relations.
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that Nicaragua and Costa Rica signed free trade agreements with Mexico, and similar
deals were in process with Canada and Chile, a situation that would leave the Northern
Triangle countries in a very unfavorable position.

V. The NAFTA Disciplines and Standards on the MNT-FTA
NAFTA played a basic role in the development of the MNT-FTA. The experience of
the Mexican delegation with NAFTA and the expectation of further integration with the
region established the base under which the MNT-FTA was negotiated. Particularly, the
MNT-FTA provisions were drafted following the NAFTA model with very few exceptions.
A focused view of the MNT-FTA reveals that the treaty includes almost all of
NAFTA's features and standards. First, the MNT-FTA incorporates free trade in all products, including agricultural goods and services; therefore, more than half of the Mexican
exports to the Northern Triangle countries were free of duties at the beginning of the
agreement. Competitive agricultural products of the Northern Triangle countries, however, such as coffee, sugar, pineapples, and bananas were excluded from the agreement
to protect the Mexican southeastern states' production. Also, Mexico negotiated special
safeguard provisions individually with each of the Northern Triangle countries.
Second, the agreement incorporates NAFTA's adoption of the basic GATT principles
of national treatment and most-favored-nation status. Also, market access disciplines
were adopted establishing the progressive removal of trade barriers and the reduction of
tariffs among the parties, including programs for limiting tariff drawbacks.
Third, the treaty follows the guidelines established by the Uruguay Round and the
NAFTA texts on sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. These provisions professed to
apply scientifically based trade disciplines to the process of adopting regulatory measures
in the area of public health, food, and drug safety. Similarly, it allows the parties to
freely establish appropriate levels of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures and levels
of protection of human, animal or plant life. In addition, the MNT-FTA adopted the
risk assessment/risk management techniques and the related principles contemplated
by the former agreements. Furthermore, the treaty addresses a chapter dedicated to
standard related measures, including regulations by which a country member has to
pre-publish any rule affecting industrial standards in order to allow those directly or
indirectly affected to offer their opinions and suggestions.
Fourth, NAFTA rules of origin were incorporated that determine the minimum
requirements of local content, which goods must comply with in order to enjoy free
trade benefits. As in NAFTA, a good qualifying as an originating good must have a
general regional value content of 50 percent, or undergone an applicable "change in tariff
headings."
Fifth, the MNT-FTA has provisions dedicated to investment, services, and related
matters, as well as rules for protecting the foreign investor. The provisions dealing with
expropriation followed the NAFTA definition as: "other forms of interference that are
tantamount to nationalization." These provisions also adopt the NAFTA language for
the subject of compensation, establishing that any payment must be made "immediately
before" expropriation, and that such price has to be calculated at a "fair market value"
and paid "in a free convertible currency in the international financial market." In the past,
Latin American countries have asserted that foreign property is subject to the exclusive
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jurisdiction of the government of the host country. The Northern Triangle countries
have now accepted the historic U.S. standard that state expropriation of foreign property
is unlawful under international law, unless it meets the conditions expressed above.
Also, the MNT-FTA addresses the topic of performance requirements, such as local
mandates for a certain percentage of local goods or services to be exported, or to be of
domestic content, or the link of local sales to the volume of exports, or the obligatory
transference of technology. The MNT-FTA did not, however, specifically consider NAFTA
concerns on the topic of mandatory levels of equity or involuntary joint ventures. The
exclusion was much more favorable to Mexico than to the Northern Triangle countries,
since the latter do not have extensive foreign investment regulations and their mandatory
national requirements are almost insignificant.
Additionally, the chapter provides a framework for settling investment disputes. The
mechanism provides that a private investor has individual standing in disputes with a
member country. This feature accepted the NAFTA standard for foreign investment and
related procedures for claims, as consultation or negotiation, and then arbitration under
the ICSID convention or UNCITRAL arbitration rules.
Sixth, the MNT-FTA covers financial services as a special chapter under the treaty.
The chapter covers the rights of financial services institutions, the investors in those
institutions, cross-border providers and consumers under the agreement. Likewise, certain provisions of the dispute settlement procedures are brought forward to apply to the
chapter. NAFTA concepts, such as market access, are also included.
Seventh, the MNT-FTA embodies the protection of intellectual property rights,
including copyrights, sound recordings, encrypted satellite signals, trademarks, patents,
industrial designs, trade secrets and geographical indications. The agreement also provides that the Member States guarantee that enforcement procedures are available under
its domestic laws.
Eighth, the treaty outlines the dispute settlement processes following the NAFTA dispute settlement guidelines contained in chapter 20, section B. The provisions construct
a three-stage dispute resolution process involving: (a) consultations; (b) a meeting of the
MNT-FTA Commission; and (c) arbitration for the parties. Settlement procedures differ,
however, from NAFTA once the arbitral panel releases its final reports for implementation. The final reports are mandatory for the contending parties within its conditions
and terms. The period to notify such reports will not exceed three months from their
communication to the MNT-FTA Commission, unless the parties otherwise decide. If
the panel has determined in a final report that a measure is incompatible with the treaty,
the complaining party will abstain to execute the measurement or will countermand it.
Ninth, the treaty also includes features for cross-border trade in services, telecommunications, temporary entry for business persons, and transparency provisions equivalent
to NAFTA's publication, notification and administration of the law's stipulations. The
treaty does not, however, cover the subject of competition policies, monopolies, and
state enterprises, which can represent a risk for the Northern Triangle countries due to
their lack of legislation in the subject and the comparative large scale of the Mexican
companies can eventually lead to monopolies in the region. Instead, the agreement covers the issue of unfair trade practices, such as export subsidies and the establishment of
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compensatory quotas. The agreement excluded the subject of government procurement;
so far, it is planned to reinitiate discussions over this issue eighteen months after it enters
in force.
Tenth, the MNT-FTA does not include any side agreements for labor and environmental issues. These exclusions raised bitter criticisms by several sectors that considered
that these issues must have been covered by the agreement. In particular, these sectors
argued that if the MNT-FTA lacks a labor side agreement, it could cause the adoption
of more flexible labor policies and, thus, generate a severe decline of workers' rights in
the region.
In sum, Mexico, with the signature of the MNT-FTA has expanded the NAFTA
matrix to almost all Central American countries. Eventually, the whole region will be
covered under a framework of NAFTA-type agreements, as similar deals are being negotiated now by Mexico with Belize and Panama, respectively. The Mexican idea is to take
benefit of the bilateral negotiations in the region; thus all treaties could harmoniously
coincide in a single instrument.

VI.

Central American Relationship with Other Regional
Treaties and Their Integration Future

A. CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE G-3 GROUP
Central American countries, with the notable exception of Costa Rica, have demonstrated inconsistent policies for trade integration. Nevertheless, the large-scale integration
forces that are interacting in the Latin American region since NAFTA have contributed
to create conditions for inserting the area into regional trading blocs.
In this regard, the Group of Three (G-3), Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, have
begun an integrative process that will lead, among other reasons, to making better use of
Free.....A
. .C

,,icut
uy uuSieSS sectors aid to expand the scope of discussions and

cooperation efforts with Central America and the Caribbean. For this purpose, Colombia
and Venezuela signed a new multilateral trade accord with five of the Central American
countries,4 paving the way for creation of a broad free trade zone in northern Latin
America.

1

On February 12, 1996, following their three-way summit, the G-3 presidents met
in Venezuela with the presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, and Panama. All attending presidents signed the Caracas Declaration (Declaraci6n
de Caracas) calling for an eventual multilateral free trade pact among all those countries.
In addition, the Declaration calls for talks with the thirteen members of the Caribbean
49
Community to eventually draw those countries into the free trade zone as well.

48.
49.

CentralAmerican MinistersDiscuss Regional Trade Reform but Show More Interest in Free Trade
with Mexico, CHRON. LATIN AM. ECON. AFF., Sept. 21, 1995, available at 1995 WL 2297502.
New Agreements on Free Trade Among G-3 Countries and CentralAmerica, CENT. AM. UPDATE
(1993), available at 1993 WL 2511730.
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B.

CARICOM

AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1. CARICOM
Central America has tried to expand its ties with the Caribbean to reinforce their
economic programs and competitiveness. In this regard, on July 24, 1994, the six
Central American countries signed an economic agreement with the thirteen-member
Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), as well as Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela,
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Surinam, to be called the Association of the
Caribbean States (ACS). s° The ACS's principal objective is to establish, for the first time
in the Caribbean Basin, a flexible framework of cooperation in the areas of economic
integration, trade, investments, transport, communications, science and technology, and
the environment."1 Also, the association called for increasing the trade liberalization
efforts among its members. As of today, however, there is only a framework agreement
between Central America and CARICOM that focuses on issues such as joint promotion
of tourism and the fight against illicit drug and arms trafficking.
2. The Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic invited the Central American countries to enter into a
trade agreement as a result of President Clinton's visit to San Jose, Costa Rica, in
May 1997. Since then, several rounds of negotiations have been launched with Central
America for setting the first comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the region. On
March 18, 2001, the Dominican Senate ratified the Free Trade Agreement with Central
America (DRCA-FTA) after two years and three months of intense debates and objections from different sectors that consider it detrimental to the commercial relations and
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In any event, the new Agreement will have to be
discussed by the House of Representatives, which has legal authority to modify it before
its delivery to the Executive Power for promulgation.
As a result of the Agreement, Dominican milk and poultry producers and those of
countries favored like "first exporters" by the WTO (New Zealand, the United States
52
and the European Union) protested the tariff benefits conferred to Central America
Accordingly, Nicaraguan and Costa Rican producers will enjoy a ten percent duty
benefit, compared with the twenty percent duty to matching products for the former
countries.53
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See O'Keefe, supra note 36, at 7.
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U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Integration Bulletin for

52.

Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (Feb. 1997), available at http://www.nanyangmba.
ntu.edu.sg/bsm/bsm.links/latin/lan/engin10.htm.
Dominicana ratific6 el TLC con Centroamerica, Terra Networks, S.A. (Mar. 8, 2001),

at http://www.terra.com.hn/articulo/html/neg8943.htm (on file with the Terra Networks
53.

Service).
Tratado de libre comercio entre Dominicana y Centroamerica, LA TRIBUNA, Mar. 18, 2001,
available at http://www.latribunahin.com/2001/marzo/16/econo.htm.
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C.

PANAMA

Central American countries have initiated negotiations to replace the Free Trade
Agreement and Effective Commercial Interchange in force with Panama under a new
treaty based on the NAFTA model, a task that has become a true challenge for the
authorities and negotiators. Nevertheless, experts assure that the process has advanced
positively and that both parties already have covered most of the negotiation issues.
Until November 2000, six technical negotiations meetings took place, alternating the seat
between Panama and a country of Central America. The first of these meetings took
place in Guatemala, followed by Costa Rica, and ending in El Salvador. Until now, the
three vice-ministerial meetings that have taken place provided important contributions
to the advancement of the negotiations.54 Central America is the second commercial
partner of Panama just behind the United States; during 1999, the trade flows between
the region and Panama reached U.S.$360 million.
D.

CHILE

Shortly after concluding the signature of the MNT-FTA, Central American governments retook the negotiations of a free trade agreement with Chile,55 which also is of
extreme importance for the commercial opening of the region. The Chilean and Central
American countries have approved the normative part of the agreement, while safeguard
clauses, dispute settlement provisions, and related aspects of investment and services
remain pending.56
E.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

1.

Canada

The reality is that the signature of the MNT-FTA has attracted the attention of
Canada to the Central American region. Now, Canada and the CA-4 group (Guatemala,
El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) have begun to negotiate subjects of market access,
services, and investments, during the meeting of Economy Ministers of the five countries ended on February 29, 2001. The negotiations were oriented to the creation of
a multilateral Free Trade Agreement. For this purpose, they were first negotiated on a
technical level, and then, the results were communicated for analysis to the economic
ministers. In an overall assessment of the process, the Canadian Foreign Trade Minister,
Pierre Pettigrew, declared that the atmosphere demonstrated in the meetings would be
favorable for the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and for the
future ministerial negotiations at the beginning of April in Buenos Aires.57 Similarly,
Costa Rica is due to sign a free trade agreement with Canada in 2001.
54.
55.
56.

TLC con Panama avanza a pasofirme, Terra Networks, S.A. (Mar. 18, 2001), at http://www.
terra.com.hn/negocios/articulo.cfm?ID + neg8851 (on file with the Terra Networks Service).
In 1996, Chile formally proposed a free trade agreement to the Central American Countries.
However, negotiation has been moving slowly.
Fredy Perdomo, Avanzadas las negociaciones del convenio commercial con Chile, DIARIO
TIEMPO, Mar. 8, 2001, available at http://www.tiempo.hn.edicante/2001/marzo/mar6/
frmain02.htm.
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2.

The United States

The most ambitious integrative effort for the Central American countries' economies
is to integrate their economies with the United States. For this purpose, the presidents
and vice-presidents of Central America countries met in El Salvador on February 27,
2001, to approach the United States about the possibility of initiating negotiations for
a Free Trade Agreement with the region (USCA-FTA). The President of El Salvador,
Francisco Flores, was delegated by his Central American colleagues with the mission to
ask the United States to begin negotiations under the context of the proposed hemispheric zone of free trade. With that objective, the Salvadoran president traveled to the
United States where he addressed this issue in a private meeting with his American
counterpart, President George W. Bush. If the Central American effort culminates successfully, it will be possible to talk about the future convergence and accession of the
region within the NAFTA framework.

F.

THE DOLLARIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The region has undergone a painful macroeconomic adjustment process to reduce
fiscal deficits and achieve stable economies. The process has brought the "dollarization"
of their economies, which in turn has removed practical obstacles to a bloc accession to
NAFTA.
Initially, El Salvador allowed the circulation of the U.S. dollar in tandem with its
currency, fixing a permanent exchange rate of 8.75 colones per U.S. dollar. Similarly, the
other Central American countries have modified their exchange policies. For example,
Guatemala has enacted legislation allowing dollar-based transaction and bank accounts
as the dollar joins the Quetzal as legal tender. In Honduras, a comparable regime already
exists, in which dollar saving accounts are a common feature, and in Nicaragua, the
dollar is legally accepted for commercial transactions. For the moment, Costa Rica has
not adopted the dollar as legal tender because it lacks sufficient international reserves,
but its Central Bank president says the country would like to make the switch within
the next year and a half.5 8 So far, the dollarization process is supported as the solution
for future foreign exchange crisis in the region.
Without a doubt, the economic integration of the region is already advancing
through a network of bilateral framework agreements, which will continue toward the
goal of hemispheric integration. In this regard, NAFTA has become the primary force
behind the current process of economic integration in the region, as its countries abandon their import substitution models in favor of more export-oriented economies. In
some way, NAFTA has promoted a new bilateralism deepening the scope of the Free
Trade Agreements, going beyond the simple reduction of tariffs and trade of goods.
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Mary A. Dempsey, Dollar Mania, LATIN TRADE MAGAZINE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 20, available at
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VII.

Conclusion

The current political conditions in the Central American region present an historic
opportunity to establish stable and productive economic relationships within its members, the Caribbean, and the Western Hemisphere. The current trend in Latin America
calls for the economic integration of its countries, a process that seems irreversible at
present.
As we have seen, the Inter-American dialogue appears to be more comprehensive
now than what it was before. Thus, cooperative solutions can be found to the problems of
Central America. It seems that the region can now present a common economic agenda
based on trade liberalization as the way to address the issues of democracy, sustainable
development, and poverty reduction. But we are still far from this objective.
Indeed, regional integration has been a common feature throughout Latin America
since the post-World War II period, but the post-communist era has released international forces that now actively drive the process. In this regard, NAFTA produced a
positive effect on the integrative efforts of the isthmus, making possible further integration with their major economic counterparts.
The Central American countries have demonstrated increasing interest in a free
trade agreement with the United States, for reasons that to a certain extent are similar
to the ones experienced by Mexico. Central America views a NAFTA-type agreement
with the United States as a guarantee for continuous access to its markets and as an
incentive for foreign investors, proceeding from either the United States or from other
countries interested in accessing this market.59 Efforts to achieve global competition,
however, overlook the social costs, as the region's economic fabric struggles to adapt to
the new realities of trade liberalization.
Important assessments come out of this integration experience. First, Central
American countries have small economies, as defined according to the size of their
territory, population, and gross national product. Hence, the internationalization of
their economies poses a serious challenge to their national structures. In our globalized
world, the small size of a country is a clear disadvantage from an economic viewpoint,
especially for a developing country. As a result, the process of trade liberalization poses
greater risks for small economies, since they are more exposed to external economic
shocks.6" Additionally, the region is vulnerable to natural disasters that aggravate the
social costs, as recent events like Hurricane Mitch and the earthquakes in El Salvador
have shown.
Second, it is well known that Central American countries have deficiencies due to
their undiversified economic base, and thus do not possess the flexibility for full trade
liberalization with more advanced economic regions. Until now, the trade arrangements
have not granted the region longer transitional periods, in order to provide for economic
adjustment and to mitigate the impact over the local societies. In addition, regional
governments have not realized the new macroeconomic reality.
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Miguel Otero-Lathrop, MERCOSUR and NAFTA: The Need for Convergence, 4 NAFTA: L. &
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See Frank J. Garcia, The Integration of Smaller Economies into the FTAA, 5 NAFTA: L. & Bus.
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To confront this problem, Central America should put into action sound modernization programs for its economies in order to achieve competitiveness. It is impossible
for the region to continue opening its markets to global commerce if governments do
not help their economies to find niches in the international markets. In fact, if regional
industries are not provided with means to adapt and are unable to compete in the new
trading system, the harm can be irreparable for their economies and societies. As a
result, the process will exacerbate the issues of inequality and social exclusion that trade
liberalization is trying to address.
Third, Central American governments have to recognize that social sectors are
not represented in the decision-making process of implementing liberalization. In part,
this exclusion comes about because the governments lack concrete, efficient, and coherent
economic agendas for the subject, especially since external forces drive the liberalization
efforts. It is advisable that the area could generate a participative development agenda
for their economies. Central American governments do not have to forget that these sectors tend to be the most affected in the transitional process. Today, their commitment is
unavoidable if some degree of political stability wants to be achieved during the process.
After all, the whole purpose of trade liberalization is to create opportunities for human
development.
Fourth, Central American countries have to consider that their commitments to
various trade agreements can reduce their further integration within the CACM. In fact,
the signature of the MNT-FTA implies that the CACM could be absorbed by larger
commercial agreements, such as NAFTA or the FTAA. This outcome appears probable
considering the size of the economies of the Central American commercial partners.
The real problem, however, lies in the pattern of political disinterestedness shown by the
Central American governments in the CACM process.
At the moment, CACM's success depends on an ability to persuade Member States
to continue the regional integration process, so they can adopt a unified approach toward
negotiating free trade agreements. The goal seems difficult to achieve as each country is
negotiating free trade agreements individually.
Fifth, the signature of the MNT-FTA meant that the Northern Triangle region gained
preferential access to the Mexican market. But, it seems evident that their undiversified
economic base will make them compete for the same market, since there is little product
differentiation and their main exports continue to be agricultural products. On the other
hand, Mexico's position is enhanced and its markets in the area have been secured. So,
Mexico's industries can promote competition among the Northern Triangle countries, as
they tried by fiscal incentives to attract the same investments.
Finally, there are extra regional events that in the medium term can affect the
economies of Central America and its prospects of further integration. In particular,
the biggest impact that we can expect is when China enters the WTO. Its entrance to
WTO will require that the United States and Europe drop all remaining import quotas
on garments and shoes by 2005. That could enable China to boost its shares of global
apparel exports from 20 percent to 47 percent according to the World Bank. Such an
outcome will send shockwaves throughout Mexico and the Central American region
whose exports rely on cheap labor.6 This projection is especially discouraging for Central
61.
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America, since the maquila industry is the most important component of its exportoriented strategy.
In addition to the above, there is the wild card of Cuba in the Caribbean. It is
conceivable to expect that the death of Castro will end the communist regime on the
island. Eventually, the United States will lift its economic sanctions and its investments
will return to Cuba. As some economists believe, such event possibly will reduce the
flow of investments to Central America, taking into account the competitive advantages
enjoyed by the island.
Despite such challenges, it seems evident that trade liberalization and economic integration present an opportunity for the region, as it offers the advantages
of globalization. Central America must, however, estimate the implications of this new
development model. The region must learn how to use new policy tools to address its
own concerns, and, therefore, a special and differential treatment principle has to be
introduced, focusing on the asymmetries in economics of their new partners. As noted,
the region has to avoid becoming the victim of "one cap fits all" policy prescriptions as
they open their economies.
In sum, the isthmus needs to manage its concerns under a new approach. It is
in this context, that a guideline expressed by Aristotle has gained new validity for the
region: "That as between equals, equality; as between unequals proportionality." Such an
approach could establish a new set of economic policies, but answering these issues is
Central America's toughest challenge.

